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This paper investigates the temporal meaning of the alterity of the Other in Emmanuel Levinas’s 
Totality & Infinity and its implications for the recent debate concerning the possibility of a non- 
anthropocentric extension of Levinas’s ethical philosophy. Through a close reading of sections 
from Totality & Infinity, I articulate, first, Levinas’s argument that because pre-reflective 
experience is characterized as an interiorizing jouissance, discourse is the condition of possibility 
for objectivity, and, second, that this discourse is afforded only by the asymmetrical ethical 
relationship that Levinas develops as his main thesis. On my argumentation, this asymmetrical 
ethical relationship is afforded by the diachronic and discontinuous temporality Levinas exposes 
in his analysis of fecundity. As such, I argue that the alterity of the Other, which, on Levinas’s 
account, shatters egoist jouissance, is inherently and radically futural. 
It is my contention that because it is this futural alterity of the Other that calls me into question 
and inaugurates ethical life, one cannot articulate categorical restrictions on what sort of Other 
could disturb me in advance or once and for all. As such, and on my argumentation, one need not 
“extend” Levinas’s account of ethics to include non-human Others, because Totality & Infinity 
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Levinas opposes Western philosophy, in its drive towards universal truth and objective knowledge, 
for effacing the alterity of the Other by appropriating alterity as a moment of self- consciousness 
or being. Ontology has attempted to violently reduce the unthematizable excess of the Other by 
systematically assimilating them in the concepts of totalizing thought. Levinas articulates his 
opposition this tradition at length in Totality & Infinity (henceforth TI) by insisting upon an 
irreducible heteronomy: an Other who remains radically outside of any relationship I might have 
with them. 
In her 2013 Levinas and the Crisis of Humanism, Claire Katz explains that “for Levinas, 
modernity’s description of the subject in terms of freedom and rationality is opposed to a positive 
understanding of the human as vulnerable and dependent.”1 She believes pedagogical methods 
inherited from modernity do a poor job maintaining the fragile ethical subjectivity 
Levinas describes in TI because “the moral theory that emerged from modernity’s view of the free 
and rational subject is a smoke screen for the underlying ethical obligation that informs those 
theories.”2 Following Katz’s insight, I aim to explicate why Levinas makes this distinction 
between ethics and morality. 
Morality is any “series of rules relating to social behaviour and civic duty,” or any attempt to 
construct a valid system of rules that can guarantee desirable behaviour when taken up and 
followed by moral agents, such as utilitarianism, consequentialism, or deontology, or any other 
systematic attempt to prescribe how one ought to be good.3 Ethics is the fact that one ought to be 
good, the exigency that, once represented, systematized, and organized, is morality.4 Levinas’s 
philosophical approach is, in general, phenomenological. He proceeds by way of 
phenomenological reduction, a “bracketing out” of second-order morality, to see how the ethical 
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exigency to value the well-being of the Other over myself first appears in pre-reflective 
experience. In TI he argues that such “a calling into question of the same ... is brought about by 
the other,” and names “this calling into question ... by the presence of the Other ethics” (TI 43). 
Katz maintains that Levinas’s Other is always and only a human other. Like the overwhelming 
majority of contemporary commentators, she interprets Levinas’s ethics as anthropocentric, as 
excluding non-human others in the first instance. It is my aim in this paper to reframe the question, 
“What Other can disturb me?” in light of the diachronous and discontinuous temporality that 
affords the ethical relationship Levinas develops as his main thesis in TI. 
I will develop two consequences of this reframing. First, because it is the Other’s alterity that 
disrupts egoist jouissance and inaugurates ethical life, and this alterity is essentially and radically 
futural, one cannot decide in advance or once and for all what Other may disturb them. And, 
second, to explain the Other’s ability to call my freedom into question as the consequence of their 
humanity, reason, dignity, suffering, or even their language amounts to a thematization of the 
essentially unthematizable: a violence to their alterity. I develop my rejoinder to Katz in a 
refinement of Levinas’s ethics as not necessarily restricted to a human Other in four sections, 
accordingly. The first three sections are exegeses of Levinas’s arguments in TI, and the final 
section engages in the contemporary debate regarding the possibility of a non-anthropocentric 
extension of Levinas’s ethics. 
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1. The Discursive Origin of Objectivity 
 
In this section, I will articulate Levinas’s relationship to phenomenology by explicating his 
unique account of embodiment, and will conclude with an articulation and defense of his 
argument that discourse is the condition of possibility for objectivity. 
Levinas claims that “the presentation and the development of the notions employed [in TI] 
owe everything to the phenomenological method” (TI 28). But he nonetheless distances himself 
from fundamental features of the respective phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. 
Husserl’s phenomenology brackets out metaphysical assumptions about objective reality to 
discover how objects first become meaningful in lived experience, prior to being coloured by 
abstract assumptions. An example of such an abstract metaphysical idea is Locke’s distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities.5 Primary qualities are simple mathematical features of 
objects in-themselves that necessarily persist through any changes the objects to which they 
belong might undergo. Secondary qualities are sensations that are the effect of primary qualities, 
such as “colours, sounds, tastes, etc.”6 They “in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but 
powers to produce various sensations in us.”7 Locke takes primary mathematical qualities to be 
original and to hold objectively, whereas secondary sensual qualities are derivative and merely 
subjective affectations. Like much of modern science, Locke attempted to reduce the truth of 
secondary qualities to their correlative primary qualities. This sort of reduction is committed when, 
for example, one posits that the true meaning of a B♭m7 chord is the mathematical relationship 
between a set of waves oscillating at different frequencies, and insists that emotional response is 
merely a subjective affect. 
Husserl’s phenomenology is opposed to such a reduction. He claims that understanding 
secondary qualities as mere subjective effects of primary objective qualities renders lived 
4  
experience derivative, which is untenable because mathematical relations are in fact discovered 
in human experience. And, as Dan Zahavi explains, Husserl’s position is that to understand 
objective mathematical principles and objects “we have to turn toward the subjectivity that 
experiences [them], for it is only there that they show themselves as what they are.”8 
In his Logical Investigations, Husserl describes intentionality as a general feature of this 
 
subjectivity. Intentionality is the concrete fact that consciousness is always consciousness of 
something.9 Zahavi explains that “one does not merely live, fear, see, or judge, one loves a 
beloved, fears something fearful, sees an object, or judges a state of affairs.”10 Regardless of 
whether I am experiencing some actually existing object, or imagining something non-existent, 
my consciousness always experiences objects. Consciousness intends an object, or is intentional. 
Intentionality is “a decisive argument against a theory,” such as Locke’s, “that claims that an 
object must influence me causally if I am to be conscious of it.”11 Because even imaginations 
intend objects—that even the hypochondriac’s paranoid dread is always dread of a tumor absent 
in reality—we need not postulate that subjective experience is influenced causally by an objective 
state of affairs to make sense of it. If we stick closely to a faithful description of 
subjectivity (pre-reflective, first-personal experience), by bracketing out the assumption that 
there is a metaphysical distinction to be made between primary and secondary qualities, we will 
encounter neither a sharp distinction nor a causal/metaphysical relationship between them.12 
Rather, in the intentional act, these qualities emerge simultaneously at the same level of reality, 
and neither can be localized to the perceiver (subject) or to the thing itself (objectivity), so 
Husserl argues that Locke’s distinction cannot be substantiated. 
 
Levinas agrees with Husserl’s rejection of Locke’s metaphysical distinction and with his 
critique of the reduction of meaning to primary qualities, but criticizes Husserl for too strongly 
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correlating noesis, the intentional act of perception, with noema, the object intended. Levinas’s 
position is that, by emphasizing their correlation, Husserl posits a naïve perceptual realism and 
effaces the “alterity” of objects, their radical inaccessibility to perception. This is why Levinas 
claims Husserl “too hastily discredit[s]” intellectualism (TI 94). 
Intellectualism posits that our experience of the world is a product of the mind’s active 
imposition of order and meaning on otherwise meaningless sense data. For the intellectualist, our 
experience of the world admits of no exteriority, it is “pure interiority.”13 Following Husserl, 
Levinas rejects that meaningless stimuli exist prior to the mind’s imposition of meaning and order. 
Because pre-reflective experience admits of no distinction between things as they appear 
subjectively and as they are objectively in themselves, this distinction is unfounded. 
 
But Levinas thinks that Husserl’s rejection of intellectualism effaces the extent to which our 
pre-reflective experiences of the world are particular to our various unique embodiments, because 
it “fail[s] to recognize the plane on which the sensible life is lived as [jouissance]” (TI 187).14 As 
Seán Hand explains, for Levinas “life is … from the beginning … full of the stuff that makes life 
enjoyable.”15 The enjoyment of material sensuality is a more primordial mode of subjectivity 
than intentionality. 
James Mensch explains that “in the bodily experience of eating an apple, our experience is 
not objectifying but affective,” in that “it is one of tastes, textures, chewing, swallowing, the sense 
of something being within us, and of hunger being satisfied.”16 Because my engagement with 
the world is not in the first instance perceptual or representational, but jouissance, a deeply 
personal and material enjoyment, “the experience that each of us has is private, not open to the 
public.”17 
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Levinas writes that “the very distinction between representational and affective content is 
tantamount to a recognition that enjoyment is endowed with a dynamism other than that of 
perception” (TI 187). The dynamism of perception, the activity or movement of intentionality, is 
objectification, insofar as consciousness is always consciousness “of” an object. But jouissance, 
precisely because we can distinguish it from perception, must involve a fundamentally different 
sort of activity. 
Material sensuality is not, as Locke would have had it, “the subjective counterpart of objective 
qualities, but [a jouissance] “anterior” to the crystallization of consciousness, I and non-I, into 
subject and object” (TI 188). As Mensch explains, “when I bite into a fresh peach, its sensuous 
presence in my mouth has no sides.”18 This enjoyment does not happen here in my mouth, but 
unfolds in a medium prior to the distinction between my body and the world. As Levinas writes, 
 
In [jouissance] quality is not a quality of something. The solidity of the earth that supports 
me, the blue of the sky above my head, the breath of the wind, the undulation of the sea, the 
sparkle of the light do not cling to a substance. They come from nowhere. (TI 141) 
 
The sensations “take form,” rather, “within a medium in which we take hold of them,” that 
“remains essential to things,” and “has its own density” (TI 130-131). Here Levinas calls this 
medium “the elemental” (TI 131), but elsewhere in TI describes it as the il y a, the “there is.” The 
il y a is Levinas’s description of being in general, indifferent to this or that existent and 
ontologically prior to the distinction between interiority and exteriority.19 When Levinas writes 
that “in [jouissance] things revert [retournent: return, turn over, go back] to their elemental 
 
qualities” (TI 134), he means that, in jouissance, sensations unfold not here in my mouth, but 
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“there” in an element that cannot be said to be in me or outside of me, that is prior to a 
distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. 
Though the elemental is prior to the distinction between the interior and the exterior, it is 
nonetheless experienced first-personally. Levinas therefore claims that “[jouissance], as 
interiorization, runs up against the very strangeness of the earth” (TI 142). Jouissance is a process 
of interiorization: “the transmutation of the other into the same” (TI 111). It returns things to an 
elemental status that admits of no exteriority—an interiority so pure as to not be posed against 
exteriority. In jouissance, Richard Cohen explains, “there is no exteriority, no otherness; 
interiority is made up of its own excited, exalted dependency, ... its immersion in the 
wealth of the world.”20 
 
Mensch makes sense of the privacy of jouissance by explaining that “embodiment 
distinguishes us” from one another, because “the uniqueness of the ego’s ipseity is a function of 
the privacy of the body in its organic functioning.”21 The fact that “no one can eat for you, sleep 
for you, breathe for you, or perform any of your functions” means that “the functioning of the 
body is non-substitutable, irreplaceable.”22 When Levinas writes that “objects are not objects 
when they offer themselves to the hand that uses them, to the mouth and the nose, the eyes and 
the ears that enjoy them” (TI 95), his claim is that objects appear in jouissance by conforming to 
my body. Precisely because it is my hearing and enjoyment of a B♭m chord, it is an experience 
that conforms in advance to my body, and not an experience of what is true for each and all. As 
things meaningfully appear for me, they are simultaneously withdrawn from intersubjective 
availability. 
Levinas thinks Husserl is right to demand we return to the pre-theoretical appearance of 
things. But by effacing the extent to which things conform to each of our sensuous, material 
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experiences of the world, Husserl’s phenomenology involves a “clarity” that “detaches the object 
from something other than itself” (TI 95). 
Levinas compares intelligibility in Husserl to Descartes’s “clear and distinct idea manifested 
as true and as ... entirely present, without anything clandestine” (TI 124). He finds in Husserl a 
clarity that he defines as “the disappearance of what could shock” (TI 124). Because things 
conform in advance to the particularities of my body, my experience “advances on a terrain 
already familiar” (TI 124). Because perception is singularly embodied, and because Husserl 
claims things exist only as they appear for the perceiver, Levinas claims that their “reality” is 
implicitly relative to the body of the perceiver. Levinas therefore claims that the “clarity” of 
Husserl’s phenomenology is tantamount to relativism (TI 96). Because Husserl stresses the 
correlation between the perceptual act and the intentional object, but ignores the singularity of 
jouissance, there is no alterity in his understanding of perception (TI 95). 
Levinas does not return wholesale to intellectualism. But he attests to and maintains alterity 
by radicalizing both the extent to which experience is contingent upon the particularities of our 
different bodies and the extent to which the intentional object is radically inaccessible to 
experience. 
For Levinas, there is no objectivity in my pre-reflective enjoyment of the world. Left to my 
own devices, I would be unable to distinguish between what sensations hold only for my private 
sensuous experience and what holds for each and for all. But if objectivity is not available to my 
material enjoyment of the world, then how is it possible at all? 
While objectivity has not yet emerged in jouissance, Levinas is not claiming that objectivity 
remains unavailable: “the objectivity of the object and its signification comes from language” (TI 
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96). I can distinguish objective meaning from subjective illusion because I can discourse with 
others. As Levinas writes, 
The generality of the Object is correlative with the generosity of the subject going to the 
Other, beyond the egoist and solitary [jouissance], and hence making the community of the 
goods of this world break forth from the exclusive property of [jouissance] (TI 76). 
Discoursing with the Other invests my experience with objectivity, and “abolishes the inalienable 
property of [jouissance]” (TI 76) by alienating things from interiorizing jouissance, rendering 
them “objective” in that they become offerable to the Other. Objectivity is thus not a theoretical 
disinterestedness, but “is defined by gift, by the abolition of inalienable property” (TI 75). The 
Other has me recognize things and the world as suitable for their needs. And it is only through 
this recognition that “the world possessed by me—the world open to [jouissance]—is apperceived 
from a point of view independent of the egoist position” (TI 75). 
Objectivity is thus inextricable from this suitability for others. And, for Levinas, discourse 
names this work of alienating things from the elemental status to which jouissance submits them. 
Levinas’s claim in Totality & Infinity, then, is that discourse is the condition of possibility for 
objectivity. 
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2. The Ethical Origin of Discourse 
 
In section III B, subsection “5. Language and Objectivity” (pp. 209-212), Levinas reiterates that 
“objectivity results from language, which permits the putting into question of possession,” or the 
undermining of objects’ conformance to my body in jouissance, but as a consequence of the 
asymmetrical ethical relationship. In this section I will explain how the discourse in which 
objectivity first emerges is afforded by the asymmetrical ethical relationship with the Other. 
Richard Cohen explains that “at [the] level of sensibility the subject is entirely self-satisfied, 
self-complacement [sic], content, sufficient.”23 This is why Levinas refers to embodiment as 
freedom, or a “determination of the other by the same” (TI 85). Because it involves an interiorizing 
jouissance, my embodiment can be understood as a freedom to take for granted the 
exteriority invested by the other, to be satisfied with pre-reflective sensuality. As Levinas writes, 
“to sense is precisely to be sincerely content with what is sensed … to maintain oneself at home 
with oneself” (TI 138-9). 
This freedom is, however, arbitrary. For the satisfied and self-sufficient subjectivity of 
jouissance, there is no objectivity but only a flow of immediate sensuality. Levinas writes that 
“in the eyes of reason, the contentment of sensibility,” the self-satisfaction of jouissance, its 
constitutive disregard for objectivity, “is ridiculous” (TI 138). In the first instance, the exigency 
for objectivity is not a rational one. Because it entails generosity, a recognition of the suitability 
of the world for others, a calling into question one’s self-sufficient experience, the exigency for 
objectivity is ethical. 
Levinas writes that “a calling into question of the same—which cannot occur within the 
egoist spontaneity of the same—is brought about by the other. We name this calling into 
question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics” (TI 43). The Other calls 
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jouissance into question, not by limiting or weakening its freedom, but by shattering it. The Other 
fractures jouissance in this way because they are radically irreducible to its subjectivity. While 
sensuous life divests things and the world of their alterity, the alterity of the Other cannot be 
divested. 
The presence of the Other is unlike the presence of things. Levinas distinguishes the speaking 
being, the Other, from its thingly manifestation, when he writes that “the speaking being 
guarantees his own apparition and comes to assistance of himself, attends to his own 
manifestation” (TI 98). The Other “appears” in such a way as to render their manifestation an 
apparition. Levinas articulates the complex appearance of the Other in “Meaning and Sense” 
(hereafter MS), where he explains that “[w]hereas a phenomenon is already ... an image, a captive 
manifestation of its plastic and mute form, the epiphany of a face is alive” (MS 53). 
Levinas calls the Other’s complex mode of presentation, the appearance that rends appearance, the 
epiphany of the face. “The Other who manifests himself in a face ... breaks through his own plastic 
essence, like a being who opens the window on which his own image was already taking form,” 
in the sense that “his presence consists in divesting himself of the form which does already 
manifest him” (MS 53). As Edith Wyschogrod explains, “the face belongs to the world it 
inhabits but must in some fashion retain the alterity of a beyond, a transcendence that is inscribed 
as a trace that attests an indestructible alterity.”24 The face, “[a]s signifying the transcendent, ... 
does not nullify what it signifies in order to force its entry into an immanent order.”25 
In TI Levinas claims that the infinity of Other, their radical irreducibility to me or any common 
concept, “stronger than murder, already resists us in his face, is his face, is the primordial 
expression, is the first word: ‘you shall not commit murder’” (TI 199). The face of the Other is the 
flash of a shocking alterity that shatters the self-sufficiency of jouissance, rendering 
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its arbitrary freedom a consciousness of shame. The Other “expresses itself [and] imposes itself 
[upon me] by appealing to me with its destitution and its nudity—its hunger—without my being 
able to be deaf to that appeal” (TI 200). 
The Other does not force me to tend to their suffering. “The expression the face introduces 
into the world does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power [mon pouvoir 
de pouvoir]” (TI 198). While I am not free to not respond to their destitution, I am free to respond 
by ignoring their destitution. I can turn away from this or that other, shirking my responsibility in 
particular cases, but am not free to not have been called into question. 
“The primordial essence of ... discourse does not reside,” Levinas claims, “in the information 
they would supply concerning an interior and hidden world, but a solicitation that concerns me by 
its destitution and its Height” (TI 200). Ethical life involves an asymmetrical valuation of the Other 
above (“higher” than) myself. This asymmetry is the condition of possibility for the discourse 
through which objectivity, the suitability of my things, my body, and my world for the Other, 
emerges. “The face,” he writes, “opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation, 
which no “interiority” permits avoiding” (TI 201). 
This is why Levinas claims that ethics is first philosophy or metaphysics.26 In the first 
 
instance, I question my satisfied and sufficient understanding of the world, that, qua jouissance, 
refuses a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, not for rational or epistemological ends, 
but for ethical ends. I desire to know how things are objectively because I want to know how 
things might serve the Other. Ethics is thus prior to ontology and to epistemology. To encounter 
things as objects—how they are objectively for others—I must encounter them as suitable to the 
Other’s needs, as offerable to “the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, to whom I 
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am obligated” (TI 215). Thus, for Levinas, the asymmetrical ethical relationship is the condition 
of possibility for the discursive relationship wherein objectivity emerges. 
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3. The Temporality of Ethics 
 
My contention in this section is that the asymmetrical ethical relation is afforded by the temporal 
diachrony that Levinas exposes in fecundity. On my argumentation, when Levinas argues that the 
Other is ontologically prior to Being, he is implicitly arguing that a diachronic temporality pre-
exists the continuous and singular temporalizations of particular existents. 
In the “Fecundity” chapter, Levinas describes parenthood to reveal a discontinuous and 
diachronic temporal structure. But making sense of his analysis of time necessitates a brief 
recollection of some features of temporality in Heidegger’s Being and Time (hereafter BT). 
Heidegger claims that Dasein has a fundamental structural involvement in the world, and 
refers to this involvement as care [Sorge]. This structural involvement is evinced in the fact that 
things always appear within the horizons of Dasein’s pragmatic projects, which are always 
possibilities afforded by the world. As such, meaning appears neither “inside” a transcendental 
subject nor “outside” in an already determined empirical world. Meaning appears, rather, there 
where Da-sein stretches out into the world: its ekstatic being-in-the-world (BT 84). 
Given that meaning appears in this way, Heidegger claims temporality must be an a priori 
condition for the possibility of meaning. As he writes, “Dasein’s totality of Being as care means: 
ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the- 
world)” (BT 375). 
For Heidegger, temporality has three modes or ekstases. Dasein is always ahead of itself 
stretching towards the future because it makes decisions by weighing the different anticipated 
futures against each other. It is always encumbered by a past because these options are afforded 
by the resources of its past decisions. And it meaningfully occupies a present because things 
appear either as relevant or irrelevant to its current concerns. Heidegger argues that because 
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these three ekstases always appear together, they evince a more primordial and unified 
temporality. When Heidegger analyzes understanding, state(s)-of-mind, and falling/discourse, he 
finds that while they are grounded primarily in the future (anticipation), the past (having-been), 
and the present (making-present), respectively, each nonetheless involves the others.27 
Temporality thus fundamentally involves all three ekstases as an intertwined and non-discrete 
whole, and, as such, is a singular and continuous flow:28 “temporality temporalizes itself ... as a 
future which makes present in the process of having-been” (BT 401). 
Levinas, too, analyzes lived experience to interrogate temporality. But because he attests to a 
subjectivity different than Dasein, he articulates a temporality that differs from Heidegger’s. 
Mensch explains that subjectivity described in TI exists generationally.29 None of us are 
 
causa sui, insofar as we are each born from an other, and it is meaningful to us that future 
generations will outlive us. Levinas teases out the temporal significance of this generational 
subjectivity in his description of parenthood in the “Fecundity” subsection.30 
There is a sense in which the son both is and is not the father: the child as “both my own and 
non-mine” is “a possibility of myself but also a possibility of the other” (TI 267). The child both 
reiterates and refuses the parent’s identity. They are both an extension of the parent’s unique 
experience of the world, insofar as they inherent a perspective on the world that to some extent 
conforms to their parent’s projects and concerns, and a being with their own body, to some extent 
free of their parent’s interests. Thus, in their relationship with their child, the parent relates to a 
future both meaningfully determined by their past and radically free from it. While carrying out 
their own life, the parent, by offering their life to the needs of the child, lives for a time radically 
other than their own, and, in this sense, the parent lives a life beyond their own 
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mortality. Levinas names this futurity fecundity: “[a] being capable of another fate than its own 
is a fecund being” (TI 282). 
The fecundity of parenthood is afforded by a temporality of reiteration and interruption. 
 
Rather than singular and continuous, Levinas understands time as disjointed and diachronous, a 
flowing plurality of non-synchronizable temporalizations. And this diachronic and discontinuous 
temporality is not localizable to the experience of biological parenthood. Levinas writes that “the 
discontinuous time of fecundity makes possible an absolute youth and recommencement,” and 
claims that “this recommencement…, this triumph of the time of fecundity over the becoming of 
the mortal and aging being, is a pardon, the very work of time” (TI 282; emphasis my own). A 
discontinuous and diachronous temporality, involving the non-synchronizable temporalizations of 
different existents, underlies and affords the fecundity of parenthood. 
For Levinas, in contrast to the “Heideggerian possibility which constitutes being itself” (TI 
267), meaning is not determined solely by the various projects at my disposal. I must anticipate 
the future not only egoistically, but as offerable to and suitable to the destitution of the Other. 
Meaning appears not only in light the possibilities of my future, but in “light” of a time other than 
my own mortality. It is thus not solely my anticipation of the future that offers meaning, but 
also the radically unanticipatable future of the Other.31 My future, more than a projection of the 
 
possibilities at my disposal, is a future offerable to the other. As such, the Other invests a radical 
sort of novelty. 
It is the non-appropriability of the Other’s future, its irreducibility to my own anticipations, 
the non-synchronizability of our unfoldings, that affords objectivity. It is the Other’s irreducible 
excess with regard to any present or common essence that invests my experience with objectivity. 
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In Existence & Existents (henceforth EE), Levinas claims that his contemporaries (e.g. 
 
Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) attest to an “existence where past, present, and future would 
be caught up all at once,” and, as such, the idea of the moment, of “the pure present,” must be 
considered an abstraction, because “the concrete present, pregnant with all its past, already leaps 
towards the future; it is before and after itself” (EE 101). A consequence of this temporality is that 
“to take human existence as something having a date, placed in a present, would be to commit the 
gravest sin against the spirit” (101). His contemporaries’ argument, expressed generally, is: lived 
experience, because it involves freedom and change, fundamentally involves time; arguments for 
the existence of a “pure present” assume the reality of an abstract and discrete moment that is 
incapable of change; thus, the affirmation of a pure present involves a denial of time that renders 
experience, at best, groundless and, at worst, illusory. 
But Levinas claims that “human existence does contain an element of stability” insofar as “it 
consists in being the subject of its own becoming” (EE 102). By attesting to a temporality that 
admits of no gaps or moments, his contemporaries contradict the stability of pre-reflective 
subjectivity. “Modern philosophy,” Levinas asserts, “has been little by little led to sacrifice for 
the sake of the spirituality of the subject its very subjectivity, that is, its substantiality” (EE 102). 
Levinas agrees that it is “impossible to conceive of substance as the persistence under the 
current of becoming of an invariable substratum,” because one could not account for how an 
invariable subject would relate to the changing world without situating the subject “outside of 
time” (EE 102). But he attests to stability of the subject through his articulation of the present. 
“The present,” he claims, “is the very fact that there is an existent,” an embodied subjectivity 
(EE 103). This is an early formulation of the provisional stability and self-sufficiency of 
jouissance in TI. He writes that “the present introduces into existence the preeminence, the 
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mastery and the very virility of the substantive” (EE 103). The subjectivity that maintains egoist 
self-sufficiency by divesting objects of their exteriority takes place in this present. It takes up a 
position that “is not equivalent to the abstract position of the idealist ego, nor to the engagement 
in the world of Heidegger’s Dasein, which always goes beyond the hic et nunc,” but rather 
consists of “the fact of putting oneself on the ground, in that inalienable here which is a base” 
(EE 104). 
“A subject’s immobility, its steadiness,” Levinas claims, “is not the result of an invariable 
reference to some coordinates of ideal space, but of its stance, the event of its position, which 
refers only to itself and is the origin of fixity in general” (EE 69). He likens subjectivity to the 
statues of Rodin, writing that “the event [Rodin’s] statues realize ... is much more in their 
relationship with the base than in their relationship with a soul, a knowing or thought, which they 
would have to express” (EE 70).32 Levinas’s point is that Rodin’s statues, like our materiality, 
presuppose the support of a unique and inalienable place and position, a hic and nunc. I could not 
be the sort of being that I am without the “present” of my embodied identity. If we suppose that 
my materiality, the ever-changing atoms and elements of which my body is composed, is 
fundamentally disinterested with my personhood, we might posit the existence of an immaterial 
soul or an absolute subject to make sense of the stability of my identity. Levinas, on the contrary, 
claims that human materiality itself necessarily takes position, or involves an inalienable hic et 
nunc, and so already attests to this stability. 
Just as in TI the provisional subjectivity of jouissance divests things of their alterity, in EE the 
ego maintains itself, remains in its “present,” by refusing temporal exteriority. “As a self- reference 
in a present,” Levinas writes, “the identical subject is ... free with regard to the past and the future” 
(EE 89). Its freedom, however, “is a weight and a responsibility,” in that it is 
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“articulated in a positive enchainment to one’s self; the ego is irremissibly itself” (EE 89). One is 
enchained to one’s ego. Because my embodiment is a constitutive taking-place, I cannot but unfold 
in the presence of my self-identity. As Levinas writes, “the dynamism of the “I” resides in the very 
presence of the present” (EE 95). But does not the experience of self-identity, as much as it 
involves stasis, the present, and sameness, also involve change, time, and difference? 
“The personality of a being,” Levinas writes, “is its very need for time as for a miraculous 
fecundity in the instant itself, by which it recommences as other” (EE 95). Personality is one’s 
capacity to remain oneself through change, to recommence as differently the same. But given the 
ego’s enchainment to the present, the difference presupposed by change is not found in the ego. 
Rather, Levinas’s claim here is that “this alterity comes only from the other,” that “the nothingness 
necessary to time, which the subject cannot produce, comes from the social relationship” (EE 96). 
This analysis of the “present” of embodied subjectivity in EE is carried forward to Levinas’s 
characterization of “the Same” in TI.33 Jouissance is characterized by a temporality that admits 
of no proper or radical future. Prior to the discursive relation, my anticipation of the future 
conforms to the particularities of my embodiment. A future sufficiently alien to call jouissance 
into question originates only from the radically unanticipatable future of the Other. 
Ethical alterity is thus inherently futural. It involves offering things and the world, even my 
own body, to the future of the Other, a future irreducible to my own anticipation. Ethical life is a 
life lived for the precarious future of the Other. And the unavailability of the Other’s future, which 
affords objectivity, is only sufficiently “alterior” because of its non-synchronizability, its 
irreducibility to my own temporality. As such, it is time’s discontinuity and diachrony that affords 
the ethical relation. 
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4. Consequence for Anthropocentrism Debate 
 
In this concluding section I articulate the practical consequences of the diachronic and 
discontinuous temporality that underlies the ethical relationship in TI. It is my contention that 
this temporality reframes the recent scholarly debate regarding the possibility of a non- 
anthropocentric extension of Levinas’s ethics. I contend that no such extension is necessary 
because the temporality of alterity in TI implies that Levinas cannot be anthropocentric or 
exclusory of non-human animals in the first instance. I will first challenge the common 
prejudgment that Levinas inherits the anthropocentrisms of Kant and Heidegger and will 
conclude by articulating how TI offers intrinsic provisions for a more-than-human ethics. 
In “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights” (Hereafter ND), Levinas recalls his time as a 
prisoner in a Nazi labor camp, explaining that while the free people who dealt with him and the 
other prisoners “stripped [them] of [their] human skin,” they were often visited by a dog named 
Bobby, for whom “there was no doubt that [they] were men” (ND 151-153). Bobby “was the last 
Kantian in Nazi Germany, without the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives” (ND 150). 
John Llewelyn, in The Middle Voice of Ecological Consciousness, takes these remarks to 
place Levinas in the Kantian tradition that excludes animals from moral consideration. He takes 
the comment that Bobby lacks “the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives” (ND 
153) to exclude Bobby from Kant’s kingdom of ends. And because he understands Levinas’s 
ethics as “analogous to the ethics of Immanuel Kant,”34 this exclusion is tantamount to exclusion 
from moral consideration in Levinas’s own ethics.35 In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida, 
too, places Levinas alongside Kant and Heidegger in a tradition that has always 
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excluded the animal from speech, reason, and dignity, claiming the “[Levinasian] subject of 
ethics, the face, remains first of all a fraternal and a human face.”36 
While Levinas is undoubtedly influenced by Kant, there are fundamental divergences between 
them. In The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, Diane Perpich explains that whereas for Kant dignity 
is “a function of the capacity for reason and thus for a moral will,” for Levinas “what matters is 
not at all a what but a who: an absolutely incalculable other who cannot be reduced to some subset 
of properties,” who is “not worthy of ethical … consideration only in virtue of 
certain qualities or capacities.”37 Contrary to Llewelyn’s interpretation, Perpich takes the 
 
comment that Bobby “was ... without the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives” (ND 
 
153) to mean precisely that, given that Kant would deny Bobby reason, “reason may not be what 
makes you ethical.”38 
Derrida includes Heidegger in the anthropocentric tradition by recalling his thesis in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics that “the stone (material object) is worldless; the animal 
is poor in world; man is world-forming.”39 Given Levinas’s intellectual debt to Heidegger, we 
might suspect he inherits Heidegger’s distinction between the animal and the human as “poor in 
world” and “world-forming,” respectively. 
However, Colleen Glenney Boggs explains when Levinas remarks that he and the other 
prisoners were “no longer part of the world” (ND 153), he “invokes and challenges Martin 
Heidegger’s argument that ‘the animal is poor in world’ whereas ‘man is world-forming’.”40 
Boggs claims rather that “Levinas indicates that the distinction between human beings and 
animals is not absolute but relational, that their position in regard to the world is not ontological 
but situational.”41 Engagement in an “objective” world is not a structural or ontological feature 
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of human life, but emerges only in ethical life, or sociality—a worldliness the prisoners found 
themselves robbed of. 
Llewelyn and Derrida’s respective texts inaugurated an interpretation wherein there is some 
principle, quality, or characteristic that makes a face “the face” in the Levinassian sense. Recent 
critics, too, have considered the possibility of a non-anthropocentric extension of Levinas’s ethics 
by assuming, first, that there is some principle at stake in Levinas’s account of the “face” (that 
secures a being its moral standing), and, second, by arguing that this principle either can or cannot 
be extended to include more than only human beings. 
Those who argue against the possibility of a non-anthropocentric extension take this principle 
to be one that cannot be attributed to animals. For Llewelyn and Derrida this exclusory principle 
is language.42 For Mensch, it is speech, so speechless beings are excluded from Levinas’s 
account.43 For Peter Atterton, it is “the ability to feel pain and organs for expressing it,” so only 
organisms complex enough to experience pain can disturb jouissance.44 And those who argue 
for the possibility of such an extension identify a principle that can be extended to include non-
human others. Christian Diehm argues that because any being with its own existential project can 
call me into question, Levinas’s account can be extended to include any self-conscious life.45 
However, in The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, Diane Perpich finds that scholars commonly 
conflate ethics, or what it is about the Other that calls egoist spontaneity into question, with 
politics, or what sort of systematic response is the most just. On Perpich’s interpretation, it is 
always another human being that disturbs the enjoyment and self-sufficiency of jouissance, but 
they introduce the possibility of distributing justice in a way inclusive of all others, not only 
humans.46 She takes Levinas’s politics to be potentially non-anthropocentric, while maintaining 
 
that his ethics excludes non-human others. 
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While I agree that Levinas’s account of ethics is not interchangeable with his politics, I 
contend that the diachronic and discontinuous temporality of TI contests Perpich’s and other 
scholars’ claims that, in the first instance, Levinas excludes the possibility being called into 
question by a non-human Other. 
To claim that only a human other can disrupt egoist spontaneity, by explaining the Other’s 
shattering of jouissance as the effect of some positive, identifiable property, is to compromise the 
futural alterity of the Other in TI, and, as such, is inconsistent with the diachronic and discontinuous 
temporality that I argue affords the ethical relationship. 
It is not the Other’s humanity, reason, dignity, language, suffering that disturbs jouissance. It 
is rather their alterity—the Other’s irreducible and radical excess with regard to my interiorizing, 
material enjoyment of the world—that disrupts the self-sufficiency of jouissance. Indeed, no 
feature that the other and I might share in common (language, the capacity for suffering, etc.) 
could act as the exigency by which self-sufficiency is disrupted. The potential commonality of 
such a feature would mean it is not radically exterior to jouissance. Because the interiorization of 
jouissance would be free to divest such a feature of its alterity, such a feature could not disrupt 
egoist spontaneity. “If the resistance to murder were not ethical but real,” if it involved not a 
radically futural alterity, but some present, empirical feature, Levinas claims that “we would have 
a perception of it, with all that reverts to the subjective in perception” (TI 199): the interiorizing 
movement of jouissance. 
Therefore Levinas describes the Other’s shattering of jouissance as an epiphany or revelation. 
The Other’s alterity entails a break and excess with regard to the present. While I can offer 
explanations of what has shattered jouissance, they always necessarily do violence to the radically 
unthematizable excess of the Other. 
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Thus there can be no atemporal criteria by which the Other ethically matters. While we can 
explain what criteria seem to have, historically, determined the moral standing of the beings before 
whom we’ve felt we must justify ourselves, if Levinas is right that a diachronic temporality 
structures experience, a possible and necessary consequence of this temporality is that we are 
exposed to possibility of radical change, to the future of the Other that fractures the “present” of 
egoist jouissance. Alterity, the face of the Other, disturbs my satisfied enjoyment of the world 
because it is radically asynchronous with my own finite temporality. It is a future more alien than 
my own anticipation of the future, that renders my body, my things, and my world offerable to the 
precarity of the Other. This asynchronicity, qua asynchronicity, cannot be reduced to the effect of 
some criteria that can be determined in advance. 
Thus Levinas’s ethics need not be “extended,” because the diachronic and discontinuous 
temporality of TI remains open to the future in a radical way, already offering intrinsic provisions 
for a non-anthropocentric ethics. Because Levinas’s rethinking of ethics presupposes a radical sort 
of futurity, it is open to an irreducible diversity of potential others. Because the future of the Other 
is irreducible to any present, given essence, one cannot clarify in advance or once and for all this 
alterity of the Other that disturbs egoist jouissance. Because alterity is on Levinas’s account 
intrinsically and radical futural, one cannot restrict in advance or once and for all what sort of 
Other can disturb me. On Levinas’s account, we cannot posit categorical restrictions on what sorts 
of beings can interrupt the self-sufficiency of jouissance. Perhaps Levinas’s narrative about Bobby 
attests precisely to the surprise of being disrupted by the alterity of a dog, to the radically 




In the first section, I articulated and defended Levinas’s argument that, because pre-reflective 
experience is characterized by the interiorization of jouissance, discourse is the condition of 
possibility for a reliable sense of objectivity. In the second section, I articulated and defended 
Levinas’s argument that this discourse is afforded by the asymmetrical ethical relationship with 
the Other. In the third section, I argued that the ethical relationship with the Other is afforded by 
the diachronic and discontinuous temporality Levinas exposes in his analysis of generational 
being, and, as such, that the alterity of the Other is inherently futural. In the fourth section, I 
argued that, because the alterity of the Other is essentially futural, Levinas’s ethics is radically 
open-ended, and we cannot categorically restrict who or what counts as an Other in advance or 
once and for all, and thus TI offers intrinsic provisions for a non-anthropocentric ethics and need 
not be “extended.” 
To say that Levinas’s ethics cannot be restricted to human others in the first instance, 
however, is not to say that it is open to all beings. A potential limitation (and future line of inquiry) 
is the capacity of Levinas’s ethics to articulate responsibilities towards existents that do not 
exhibit temporal processes. Although he claims that even “the arm of Rodin” may disrupt egoist 
jouissance,47 insofar his account of the face, on my interpretation, depends on the non- 
synchronicity of temporal flows—on a futural alterity that rends its own image—it is not clear 
 
how such a disruption could be sustained by, for example, a stone. Levinas’s descriptions of the 
irresponsibility of images seems to suggest that jouissance is only fractured by existents who 
evince change. Existents who do not, or do so only over durations whose spans exceed the 
capacities of human perception—such as, perhaps, a rock, a mountain, or a work of art—may be 
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